A major shift in thinking about Asia-Pacific security issues has occurred since March 1996, when a series of PRC missiles splashed down near Taiwan's major northern and southern ports. Since then, government officials, military planners, think tank analysts, and other close observers of the region have been reassessing their views of the PRC's potential role as a world power.
Some of the most worrisome issues involve Beijing's stance on sovereignty. The South China Sea and Taiwan are prime examples. Beijing's repeated claims of sovereignty over most of the South China Sea, and its actual seizure of various islands and reefs, including the 1995 takeover of the aptly named Mischief Reef also claimed by the Philippines, set off warning bells throughout Asia. The number of security-related conferences around the region has soared over the past two years.
As far as Taiwan is concerned, Beijing holds that the island is "part of the one China," which means that Taipei should acknowledge that it is actually a "local government" subordinate to Beijing's rule. That this statement is not rejected out of hand by all thinking persons is an indication of widespread confusion over the meaning of "one China," a term used by both Taipei and Beijing.
Taiwan is not now, nor has it ever been, a province of the People's Republic of China. Taiwan is part of historical China, yes, a China that one day may be reunified. But the Chinese civil war of the 1940s did not end with the absorption of Taiwan as a province of the PRC. The Republic of China, established in 1912, certainly holds less territory today--only Taiwan and several offshore islands--but it has nevertheless enjoyed uninterrupted existence and autonomy. The ongoing attempts by Beijing to achieve by rhetoric what it could not by force of arms is demonstrated by its repeated claim that "Taiwan is part of China," by which it means "Taiwan is part o f the PRC." But these two claims are decidedly not equivalent.
Moreover, it is not in the interests of other countries, including the United States, to blithely accept Beijing's claim--imagine the threat to sealanes in the region, for instance, if Kaohsiung's huge port and nearby airfields were controlled by mainland China's military forces. The US "engagement" of mainland China needs to include "deterrence" as well if Beijing is to be dissuaded from wielding its growing power in ways that threaten regional security.
Should the US policy goal be to engage, contain, or constrain mainland China? And what does this mean for Taiwan's own security?
In some respects, time is on Taiwan's side, because there is now an expanding public debate in the United States about President Bill Clinton's PRC policy. The question is whether mainland China will choose to become integrated into world markets and will seek an acceptable role in the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, or if it will seek to become the dominant power, by force if necessary.
The debate has been prompted in large part by two books: The Clash of Civilizations, by Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington, and The Coming Conflict with China, by Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, journalists formerly based in Beijing.
In brief, these analysts challenge the assumption that as the PRC's economy modernizes it will inevitably become more like the West--non-ideological, pragmatic, materialistic, and progressively freer in its culture and politics. Instead, they warn, return to a form of Cold War tension in Asia is a distinct possibility. Bernstein and Munro, for instance, say that China's military modernization, aggressiveness in the South China Sea, and belligerent attitude toward Taiwan all raise the specter of a direct challenge to American interests.
Those on the other side of the debate--typified by Robert Ross in his recent article in Foreign Affairs--urge pat ience, pointing out that the PRC's military, despite a major increase in funding, is third-rate at best compared with that of the United States and Japan. They argue that there is at least a ten-year span before any PRC military build-up could be threatening, and even then the already substantial US lead in high-tech warfare could be expected to leave China even further behind. Therefore, there is no urgency to shift into a Cold War mentality. Instead, every effort should be made to draw the PRC into the World Trade Organization, to urge it to become a productive participant in international organizations, and to engage it productively in discussions on issues such as nuclear testing, arms sales, and human rights.
In fact, Taiwan's position benefits from the arguments on both sides of the debate. If Beijing continues to elicit world concern through its continued repression at home, expanded territorial ambitions in Asia, and refusal to abide by international economic norms on such issues as fair trade , copyright protection, and non-use of slave labor, the US will be forced to shift its policy toward Beijing by matching attempts at engagement with threats of deterrence. In such a circumstance, Taiwan figures even more importantly because of its strategic location in the Asia-Pacific region.
On the other hand, if the mainland China softens its authoritarian political stance domestically, puts regional sovereignty disputes on hold, and takes positive concrete actions to integrate regionally and globally, the US will be more likely to continue emphasizing its engagement policy, which also benefits Taiwan's economic and political health. Just which side will win out in the US policy debate depends largely upon Beijing's actions--not its promises--in the months ahead. This is one reason why so many eyes are now on Hong Kong.